Introduction 1
On Saturday February 7 2009, 173 people lost their lives and more than 2000 homes were 2 destroyed in bushfires in the Australian state of Victoria. Fires burned under the most severe 3 fire weather conditions on record in Victoria, with a record high maximum temperature of 4 46.4°C (115.5ºF) in Melbourne, record low relative humidity, and strong winds throughout 5 the state (Karoly 2009 ). These conditions were accurately forecast, and Victorians had been 6 warned to prepare for 'the worst [fire danger] day in the history of the state' (Premier of 7 Victoria, John Brumby, cited in Moncrief, 2009 ). The day saw more than 400 fires across 8 Victoria, with most of the major fires started by fallen powerlines or arson (Teague et al., 9 2010 ). Fires quickly burned out of control as communities came under threat with little or no 10 official warning. The speed, intensity and extent of the fires meant that firefighting capacities 11 were stretched and, in line with official advice for all bushfires, most residents responded 12 without direct assistance from fire services. Under the 'Prepare, stay and defend or leave early' (PSDLE) policy, Australian fire services 22 had advised residents to prepare to stay and defend their homes and properties against 23 bushfire, or to prepare and leave well before a fire arrived in their area (AFAC, 2005a ). This 24 advice was based on evidence that residents can protect houses from bushfires, provided they 25 are prepared to do so, and that a large number of deaths have occurred during late 26 evacuations.
1 However, with police reports that 113 people had died inside their homes in the 27 with an independent analysis of the factors that contributed to the fires' severity and impacts. 39
Research covered three broad areas: fire behaviour; human behaviour and community safety; 40 and building and planning issues. This paper presents findings from the human behaviour and 41 community safety research, which investigated factors that influenced patterns of life and 42 property loss/survival across the fire affected areas. The paper begins with an overview of the 43 Australian approach to community bushfire safety, before discussing the research questions 44 and methods that were used to conduct the research. Key findings are then presented and 45 discussed. The paper concludes by considering the implications of the research for 46 community bushfire safety -in particular, the applicability of the PSDLE approach. At issue was whether residents should have the option to stay and defend their  101 homes from wildfire, which some U.S. citizens had done in the past, or whether the practice 102 of mandatory evacuation should prevail. Queen (1995) argued that several of the fatalities in 103 the 1991 Oakland firestorm could have been prevented if the victims had waited until the fire 104 front had passed before leaving the area. He went on to note that: 'What may work in 105
Australia may not work in the U.S. However, evacuation is clearly not the only option. The 106 decision to evacuate is a difficult one to make. The responsibility of making this decision 107 rests with the occupants, not the firefighter' (Queen, 1995, p. 23 ). In contrast, McMeekin 108 (1995) outlined an approach to 'population protection' that, despite involving greater 109 community engagement and planning, is largely focused on facilitating agency-led 110 evacuations. Decker (1995) emphasised the needs for residents to '… create defensible space 111 around their homes and to respond immediately to evacuation orders rather than waiting until 112 the last moment'. More recently, the National Fire Protection Association published a feature 113 article presenting arguments for and against the PSDLE approach in the USA (see Schorow, 114 2011) . 115
116
The Australian approach has served as a reference point for debates over alternatives to 117 evacuation in the United States. Scholars have generally agreed that 'Prepare, stay and 118 defend' may be a viable alternative to evacuation in some situations, but that contextual 119 differences -including the characteristics of wildfires and populations at risk -may mean 120 that it is inadvisable in some locations (Paveglio et al., 2008; McCaffrey and Rhodes, 2009; 121 Stephens et al., 2009). Another key difference is that, in Australia, the PSDLE approach 122
arose from a tradition of rural self-reliance and household firefighting practices, rather than 123 policy. Significant institutional challenges have also been identified -such as redefining 124 agency roles and responsibilities, educating and building the capacities of communities, and 125 promoting 'shared responsibility' for wildfire risk -that would need to be overcome for the 126 strategy to be successful (Paveglio et al., 2008; McCaffrey and Rhodes, 2009 ). Unlike in 127 Australia, where it has been emphasised that staying requires active defence, passively 128 'sheltering-in-place' has been considered an alternative to evacuation (Cova et al., 2010) . In 129 southern California, for example, Rancho Santa Fe has been actively promoted as a 130 community that is designed to enable residents to 'shelter-in-place' during wildfires 131 (Paveglio et al., 2008) . 132
133
Although the PSDLE policy had not undergone formal evaluation prior to the Black Saturday 134 fires, fire services and many residents considered it a sound approach for reducing losses of 135 life and property. Nevertheless, a number of studies had identified problems concerning its 136 implementation. In a study of residents' understandings of the policy, Rhodes (2005) found 137 that while most people believed that 'stay and defend' was a viable strategy for protecting 138 property, most did not see it as a strategy for protecting life. He argued that this is why most 139 people prefer to 'wait and see' what a fire is like before they decide whether to stay or leave, 140 which creates the potential for late evacuation. Tibbits and Whittaker (2007) 
Intended responses 232
A broad range of factors influenced intended responses, including: age; physical capacity, 233 mobility and health; responsibility for children, the elderly and others who require assistance; 234 responsibility for pets and livestock; the location of property; perceptions of preparedness and 235 capacities to defend; and the presence or absence of household members during the fire. 236
Respondents were asked what, prior to February 7 2009, they had thought they would do if 237 confronted by a bushfire. Half reported their intention to stay and defend throughout the fire 238 (50%), while less than a fifth (19%) intended to leave before they came under threat (i.e. 239 'early'). Just 22 respondents (< 2%) had intended to leave their homes because it was a day of 240 high fire danger (regardless of whether a fire had started). 241 242 Analysis revealed a gender dimension to intended responses. A greater proportion of men 243 (56%) intended to stay and defend throughout the fire than women (42%), who more often 244 wanted to leave as soon as a fire was threatening than men (23% and 11%, respectively). A 245 chi-square test confirmed that the association between these variables was statistically 246 significant, X 2 (7, N = 1134) = 50.25, p = < .0001. These findings are consistent with research 247 on gendered responses to bushfire, which has found that women are more likely to want to 248 evacuate when confronted by bushfire (see . 249 250 Significantly, more than one-quarter of survey respondents (26%) were effectively 251 undecided, intending to stay and defend but leave if they felt threatened (17%) or to wait and 252 see what the fire was like before deciding to stay or leave (9%). Those who were not fully 253 committed to leaving early or staying to defend were effectively adopting a 'wait-and-see' 254 strategy. 'Wait-and-see' strategies greatly increase the risk of late and dangerous evacuations. 255
As noted above, the opportunity for safe evacuation is likely to have passed once a fire has 256 reached or is in close vicinity of a person's home or property. 257 258
Warnings 259
Warnings played a pivotal role in household responses to the fires. As noted above, the 260 extreme fire weather experienced on February 7 had been accurately forecast, and authorities 261 had warned of the potential for the worst fire danger in Victoria's history. Indeed, 99% of 262 survey respondents claimed to have known that February 7 was a day of Total Fire Ban. 263
However, interviews revealed that these warnings did not necessarily lead to greater alertness 264 or pre-emptive action (see Whittaker et al. 2009a) . The vast majority of those who undertook late evacuations arrived at their destination 291 unharmed. Consequently, most indicated they would take the same action if there was a 292 similar fire in the future (74%). They often explained that life is more important than 293 property, and that staying to defend is not worth the risk. Importantly, however, most did 294 express an intention to leave earlier. Those who said they would stay and defend against 295 future fires often explained that their circumstances had changed (e.g. no longer responsible 296 for children or the elderly) or that they were now better prepared and able to defend. 297 16 
298

Those who stayed 299
Reflecting the data on intended responses, a greater proportion of men (62%) stayed and 300 defended than women (42%). Most stayed to protect assets from the fires (83%); however, 301 some stayed because they felt it was too late to leave (9%) or because their attempts to leave 302 were unsuccessful (3%). Those who stayed because it was too late to leave, or because they 303 were unable to leave, suffered double the rate of house destruction (31%) than those who 304 stayed because they wanted to protect their house and other assets (16%), highlighting the 305 importance of prior planning and preparedness. Nevertheless, most had felt confident they 306 could do what was required to protect themselves and others (78%) and their house and 307 property (69%). 308
309
Many of those who stayed to defend received help from members of their household (50%), 310 family, friends and neighbours (48%) and/or fire and emergency services (13%). Such help 311 appears to have influenced patterns of property loss, with higher rates of house destruction 312 among those who did not receive help (3 in 10 destroyed) than those who were helped by 313 household members (1 in 10), family, friends and neighbours (1 in 10) and fire and 314 emergency services (3 in 100). 315 316 One-third (38%) of those who stayed to defend left at some stage while their property was 317 under threat. The most commonly cited reason for leaving a house or property was that it was 318 too dangerous to stay and defend (44%). Other reasons were that there were flames in the 319 immediate vicinity of the property (33%) and to remove other household members or visitors 320 from danger (26%). One-quarter left because utilities or equipment failed (26%) and/or 321 because their house caught fire (18%). Many of these residents reported encountering the 322 same dangers as those who evacuated late, such as smoke (74%), embers (59%), poor 323 visibility (56%), flames (56%) and fallen trees (37%). 324
325
The majority of respondents who stayed with their home or property indicated that they 326 would take the same action if there was a similar fire in the future (76%). This is reflective of 327 the success of the PSDLE approach for most people during the February 7 fires, and the fact 328 that many now feel better prepared and more capable of defending against bushfire. Those 329 who said they would leave in the future tended to have negative experiences of staying, and 330
were not willing to risk their or others' lives to protect property. 331 of those who intended to stay and defend throughout the fire did so (72%). Importantly, the 2 majority of those who intended to stay and defend but leave if threatened ended up leaving 3 (79%). Similarly, most of those who intended to see what the fire was like, or wait for advice 4 from emergency services, left once the fire had arrived (63% and 52%, respectively). Those who 5 intended to leave as soon as they became aware of a fire most often left, either before or when 6 the fire arrived (48% and 43%, respectively). It is significant that the majority of those who 7 intended to leave on all high fire danger days (n=22), regardless of whether there was a fire, left 8 before the fire arrived (91%). 9
332
Relationship between intentions and actions
Relationship between household response and house damage 11
One-third (33%) of survey respondents reported that their house was destroyed in the fires, 12 with the highest rates of destruction (the percentage of houses lost in each area) in the 13 Murrindindi (47%), Churchill (39%) and Kilmore East (33%) fires. 
Discussion and conclusions 27
The findings in this paper largely reinforce past bushfire research, while providing new 28 insights into a range of community safety issues. Arguably the most important debate 29 following the Black Saturday fires concerned the appropriateness of the PSDLE policy and 30 its implementation by authorities and residents. The fact that 113 of the 173 fatalities 31 occurred inside houses meant that the policy and its evidence base were scrutinised. Critics 32 argued that the policy, as implemented, had contributed to fatalities by encouraging people to 33 stay and defend homes that were not defendable under such extreme conditions. However, 34 critics typically assumed that those who died had been defending at the time of death. 35 Subsequent analysis of the fatalities found that more than two-thirds (69%) had been 36 sheltering passively when they perished . While some of these people 37 may have attempted to defend before taking shelter, '… few fatalities were found near 38 Most respondents claimed they had previously thought it likely that a bushfire would occur 48 where they lived (78%) and rated the threat as high or very high (67%). Lower levels of 49 bushfire awareness were recorded in more suburban locations (e.g. in or on the outskirts of 50 towns or regional cities) where many residents did not have prior experience or knowledge of 51 bushfire and had not considered themselves at risk. These results probably exaggerate 52 awareness levels prior to Black Saturday and certainly say little about people's 53 understandings of bushfire risk. In any case, research has shown that awareness of risk does 54 not necessarily spur planning and preparedness (Berringer, 1998 defended their homes and properties. The research reported in this paper revealed a survival 72 rate of 77% for houses that were defended by one or more household members, and 44% for 73 houses that were unattended. 4 These results are comparable to the house survival rates 74 recorded by Wilson and Ferguson (1984) shown, having an intention to leave early does not necessarily mean that people will do so. 135
Confusion over the meaning of 'leave early' and difficulty recognising when it is too late to 136 leave (Tibbits and Whittaker, 2007) 
